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WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN 
BOY ORATOR, BROKEN MAN, AND THE "EVOLUTION" 
OF AMERICA'S PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 
TROY A. MURPHY 
He wanted our religion to rest on  the basis of love and not  on  the  basis of force; and, my 
friends, when we get down to the root of our government, and the root of our religion, we 
find that  they alike rest on  the doctrine of human brotherhood-"that all men are created 
equal." 
- William Jennings Bryan, o n  Thomas Jefferson1 
If you would be entirely accurate you should represent me as using a double-barreled shot- 
gun, firing one barrel a t  the elephant as he  tries to enter the treasury and another at  
Darwinism-the monkey-as h e  tries to enter the schoolroom. 
- William Jennings Bryan, on  his own life's work2 
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Perhaps  more than any other figure in Ameri- 
can history, William Jennings Bryan is remem- 
bered for specific and identifiable moments of 
rhetorical action: the  much-revered 1896 
"Cross of Gold" speech and the much-maligned 
Scopes "monkey trial" of 1925. T h e  dissonance 
between these two events, at  least with re- 
spect to the  ways in which political and rhe- 
torical history has traditionally recorded them, 
could not be more striking. Bryan, the "Boy 
Orator," was, at  thirty-six years, the youngest 
and most left-leaning candidate ever to re- 
ceive a major party nomination for the US 
presidency. He  is often regarded as the founder 
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FIG.  1. The  Honorable William Jennings Bryan, 
1890. Courtesy of the Nebraska State Historical 
Society. 
of the  modern Democratic party if not  much 
of modern liberalism. T h e  causes for which 
the  former Nebraska congressman and three- 
time presidential candidate fought anticipated 
and buttressed many of the Progressive Era's 
largest accomplishments. Years after Bryan's 
death, Herbert Hoover would note his legacy 
with some bitterness, saying that  Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's New Deal was merely "Bryanism 
under new words and methods."j Bryan would 
make a distinctively rhetorical mark as well. 
Michael Kazin calls him the  first "celebrity 
politician," a man  whose oratorical skills 
earned him a massive and loyal following of 
supporters willing to travel miles just to hear 
him speak.4 His barnstorming campaign prac- 
tices and popular rhetoric changed the  face of 
presidential campaigning, and perhaps presi- 
dential governance, by making both candi- 
date and message more immediately accessible 
to the American public. For Bryan's many 
admirers, he  was a man ahead of his time. As 
Myron Phillips put it simply, Bryan was born 
"thirty years too soon."5 
Yet his performance as a witness in Tennes- 
see w .  Scopes, the so-called trial of the  century, 
engenders a much different perception of Wil- 
liam Jennings Bryan. When,  in the final scene 
of lnherit the Wind ,  Spencer Tracy laments that  
"there was much greatness in the man," view- 
ers of the film version of the  Scopes trial are 
left wondering what that  greatness might have 
been or how a fall from grace might have oc- 
curred so dramatically. According to  both  
popular lore and most standard histories of 
the trial, Bryan revealed himself as a woefully 
ignorant leader of small-minded fundamen- 
talism, a man whose rigid interpretation of 
the Bible exemplified a backward defense of a 
long-past ethic. H. L. Mencken referred to 
Bryan variously as a "zany," a "mountebank," 
"a peasant come home to the  barnyard," and a 
"poor clod . . . deluded by a childish theol- 
~ g ~ . " ~  The Nation described Bryan's perfor- 
mance as that of a "pitifully ignorant old man."' 
Taking his cue from Paul Anderson's widely 
circulated reporting on  the  trial, which pro- 
claimed that  "Bryan was broken, if ever a man 
was broken," rhetor ica l  scholar Michael  
Hostetler describes the various characteriza- 
tions of Bryan's ostensible demise in the Scopes 
trial as the  "broken man narrative."$ This  
narrative not only interrogates Bryan's intel- 
ligence on  the witness stand and his funda- 
mentalist Christian beliefs, but is premised o n  
an  underlying assumption that  his anti-evolu- 
tion crusade was contrary if not  antithetical 
to the progressive causes h e  so famously cham- 
pioned for decades. In  the  influential Ameri- 
can Political Tradition, Richard Hofstadter ends 
his scathing critique of Bryan with a disdain- 
ful view as simple as Phillips's was admiring, 
saying that Bryan "had long outlived his time."9 
The  popular images of William Jennings 
Bryan that resonate throughout history are at  
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times as contradictory yet oddly informative 
as applying the adjective "great" to the noun 
"commoner" to describe him. Certainly, the 
labels "boy orator" and "broken man" are cari- 
catures of Bryan and his career in public life. 
Yet history nonetheless has been inclined to 
distinguish between a "good" and a "bad" 
Bryan, or a n  "early" and a "late" one.1° Indeed, 
the ostensible transformation from the silver- 
tongued "Boy Orator of the Platte" to the dis- 
credited and  ignorant "broken man" has 
enough holding power to warrant a n  exami- 
nation of its causes and a rhetorical assessment 
of the events most central to its constitution. 
I argue here that  at  the heart of the trans- 
formation lies a consistency. By examining the 
"Cross of Gold" speech delivered at  the  1896 
Democratic convention and the "On Evolu- 
tion" speech prepared and widely distributed 
after the Scopes trial, I mean to highlight the 
ways in which these texts rhetorically create a 
c o n s o n a n t  v is ion of democracy t h a t  is 
grounded in the republican ideals of agrarian 
community." Bryan's populist rhetoric con- 
sistently defends a democratic ideal, expressed 
in part through the nobility of "plain people" 
and the moral fabric of agrarian communities, 
against the attacks of a rapidly changing world 
and the "force" of a supposed elite, whether 
those elites are the  bankers of 1896 or the 
scientists of 1925. 
Highlighting a measure of consistency in 
Bryan's rhetorical battles against both "gold" 
and "evolution" is not  intended simply to re- 
vise or reclaim a reputation destroyed by what 
Edward Larson calls the "legend" of the Scopes 
trial.'' Rather, the consistency in Bryan's vi- 
sion of democracy illustrates an  enduring strain 
of democratic discourse that  yearns for and 
attempts to defend a communal and moral di- 
mension of democracy against a "public phi- 
losophy" of political liberalism that emphasizes 
individual rights and "brackets" such issues 
from public d i scuss i~n . '~  Bryan's fundamen- 
talism or anti-evolution crusade need not be 
defended today in order to understand how 
the impetus to defend those beliefs springs from 
a particular understanding of democracy, the 
saliency of which is dependent on  the politi- 
cal and rhetorical context in which democratic 
claims are made. I conclude the analysis of 
Bryan's democracy by suggesting how the ide- 
als he  articulated continue to resonate today, 
albeit in much different political and rhetori- 
cal forms. Before illustrating how Bryan at- 
tempts to define the  preferred character of 
democracy in both the  1896 campaign and 
the Scopes trial of 1925, I begin by noting the 
importance of viewing democracy as a n  inher- 
ently rhetorical enterprise. 
DEMOCRACY, RHETORIC, AND 
AMERICA'S PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 
Democracy is more than a form of govern- 
ment. It is also a n  idea. In his cultural history 
of American democracy, Robert Weibe traces 
the historical ambiguity associated with the 
meaning of democracy and how it has oper- 
ated as an  idea throughout American history. 
Calling it "America's most distinguishing char- 
acterist ic,"  Weibe  wryly comments  t h a t  
"Americans act as if democracy were too im- 
portant to define."14 The  absence of a consen- 
sus definition is certainly not for lack of trying. 
Virtually every major political figure and so- 
cial movement has in some way attempted to 
utilize the ideals associated with the term to 
their rhetorical advantage. As a n  idea marked 
by such rhetorical elasticity, the ambiguous 
and malleable meaning of democracy is per- 
haps best understood by the discourse used to 
define it within specific historical contexts. 
Historian Russell Hanson concurs on  the 
centrality of discourse in understanding de- 
mocracy, arguing that American democracy is 
itself a rhetorical tradition. While admitting 
that "to speak of liberal democracy as a rhe- 
torical tradition may seem a bit odd," Hanson 
insists that  understanding American democ- 
racy by the discourse used to define it provides 
a historical specificity lacking in other forms 
of analysis. He  maintains that  most Ameri- 
cans think of democracy as either a specific 
set of institutional arrangements, or, more 
abstractly, as that  which is somehow superior 
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to communism or socialism. However, Hanson 
argues "that way of construing it has the  sin- 
gular disadvantage of reducing liberal democ- 
racy to a set of ideas that  seem to exist apart 
from or independently of the political institu- 
tions and practices they inform."I5 
There is n o  ahistorical, definitive, or ety- 
mological standard capable of determining the 
proper meaning of democracy across histori- 
cal contexts. O n e  need not revisit the founda- 
t iona l  deba tes  be tween  Federalists  a n d  
Antifederalists to appreciate how America's most 
sacred ideal was once one of its most scorned 
ideas, As a rhetorical construct, democracy is 
historically contingent; its meaning, continu- 
ously mediated through language and thus 
achieving explanatory power in the minds of 
citizens, is always dependent o n  the manner 
in which it is articulated and the context in 
which it operates. 
Rhetorical inquiry is uniquely situated to 
shed light o n  how the meanings of democracy 
are constituted, change over time, and become 
naturalized to the point where they are taken 
for granted, becoming the  "common sense" 
that  directs action within a given historical 
moment. Tracing the ways in which politi- 
cally sacred ideals such as democracy are in- 
voked in public argumentation across time and 
in different contexts is consistent with Michael 
McGee's influential theory of the  ideograph.16 
McGee posits that  the link between rhetoric 
and ideology-between situated, practical dis- 
course and the structures or systems in which 
they take on  meaning-is best understood 
through examination of culture-specific and 
collectively honored ideographs. "Liberty," 
"freedom of speech," and "equality" are ex- 
amples of such abstract, normative terms that  
contain and express a particular ideological 
commitment. McGee describes ideographs as 
ordinary-language terms "pregnant" with ide- 
ology . I7  In their work Crafting Equality, Celeste 
Condit  and John  Lucaites demonstrate the  
ways in which the commonsense meaning of 
the ideograph "equality" has been "crafted" 
through time and by a multiplicity of voices. 
They describe how the term "equality" has 
undergone "perpetual transformation" since 
it was first introduced into American rhetori- 
cal culture, continuously serving as a "discur- 
sive foundation of American public life."'" 
Similarly, democracy may be understood as 
a historically contingent rhetorical construct 
which is both creator and creation of a "public 
philosophy," a foundational set of understand- 
ings Michael Sandel describes as "the often 
unreflective background to our political dis- 
course and  pursuit^."'^ The  enacted rituals 
and rhetorical events operating in the public 
arena serve as a n  intuitive point of reference 
for individuals to make sense of the world, as 
well as a source from which a nation might 
collectively form its identity. 
Seeking to understand the meanings of de- 
mocracy within specific historical periods thus 
highlights both the  historical legacies and 
contemporary continuit ies tha t  guide the  
meaning and manner of our self-governance. 
Thus, we might view democracy as a type of 
rhetorical collage, a mythological construct 
whose symbolic meanings "provide a way to 
understand such abstract political entities as a 
nation and a means (indeed the compulsion) 
of identifying with them."20 Like a collage, the  
most salient features of which change with 
each successive layer, the meaning of democ- 
racy is imbued with layers of history, but is 
continually constructed anew to fit the spe- 
cific context in  which public arguments are 
being advanced. 
In  the sections that  follow, I highlight how 
William Jennings Bryan attempts to create and 
define a n  understanding of democracy appro- 
priate to the rhetorical contests and contexts 
in which he  engaged. In the period from the 
mid-1890s to the end of his life only days after 
the  Scopes trial concluded, few Americans 
were better known-and even fewer were more 
often heard-than Bryan.ll Between his 1896 
campaign for the  presidency and his role in 
the 1925 Scopes trial, Bryan would become 
the "most important figure in the reform poli- 
tics of A m e r i ~ a . " ~ ~  He  would twice more run 
for the highest office and continue to speak 
out in favor of such issues as woman's suffrage, 
WILLIAM IENNINGS BRYAN 87 
a federal income tax, state initiative and ref- 
erendum, a department of labor, and campaign 
fund disclosure. 
In addition to his commanding role in poli- 
tics, Bryan was one of the most recognized and 
popular figures in a series of adult education 
and community programs known as circuit 
chautauqua.  I n  his history of t h e  circuit  
chautauqua and its adult education predeces- 
sors such as the  lyceum, John Tapia character- 
izes chautauquas  dur ing th is  era as par t  
education, part entertainment, and part ve- 
hicle for social change.13 Leroy Ashby concurs 
on  the importance of the chautauqua, describ- 
ing it as the  "centerpiece of American mass 
culture from t h e  1890s in to  t h e  1 9 2 0 ~ . " ~ ~  
Chautauquas, which enjoyed the most popu- 
larity throughout the rural Midwest, provided 
a forum in which speakers such as Bryan com- 
monly invoked the  value of rural life and the  
ideal character of agrarian c ~ m r n u n i t i e s . ~ ~  
In both politics and mass culture, Bryan 
loomed o n  the  national stage like n o  other 
public figure. William Allen White argues that 
Bryan "influenced the  thinking of the Ameri- 
can people more profoundly than any other 
man of his generation."16 His views, perhaps 
as important as any figure of the era, begin to 
map the  rhetorical terrain of American de- 
mocracy. I begin the  analysis with his most 
recognized speech and the most heralded of 
his campaigns, the "Cross of Gold" and the 
1896 pesidential  campaign. 
THE CRIME OF '73: CRUCIFYING MAN- 
KIND ON A "CROSS OF GOLD" 
N o  issue received more popular and politi- 
- - 
cal attention in  the era immediately preced- 
ing the  rise of the  populist movement and 
Bryan's first candidacy for president in 1896 
than the  "money question." Roughly speak- 
ing, the  question revolved around both the  
quantity and the basis of the  nation's money 
supply: would the  U S  government base its 
monetary system o n  a standard of gold, a 
combination of gold and silver (bimetallism), 
or paper dollars backed by the credit of the 
F I G .  2. WilliamJennings Bryan, c .  1896. Courtesy 
o f  Nebraska State Historical Society. 
government? Throughout most of the  nation's 
history, the  United States recognized both 
gold and silver, the  latter metal backing the 
dollar at  a ratio of "sixteen to  one," meaning 
sixteen times as many grains of silver as gold 
were required to constitute an  equivalent dol- 
lar. 
T h e  Coinage Ac t  of 1873 officially demon- 
etized silver, placing the  nation o n  the single 
gold standard. T h e  "Crime of '73," as it be- 
came known to populist reformers, quickly 
achieved symbolic status as a conspiratorial 
act by the  monied classes, acting through the 
legislatures, to continue a contracted money 
supply, thereby effectively weighing t h e  
economy against those who borrowed money 
and in favor of the  capital-holding class. Sta- 
bilizing the  economy of a rapidly growing na- 
tion and achieving a "sound" dollar was of 
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course not as simple as many populist reform. 
ers believed. By the time of Bryan's campaign, 
various legislative actions amended and modi- 
fied the original act of 1873, but the gold stan- 
dard as a "crime" remained salient to populist 
reformers. The  symbolism of gold versus silver 
fit quite neatly within a populist framework 
that Richard Hofstadter describes as "social 
dualism," a persistent division between "two 
nations," rhetorically drawn in various ways 
but often succinctly understood as a distinc- 
tion between the "robbers" and the 
Bryan's knowledge of monetary policy was 
perhaps limited. He  once proclaimed that  h e  
was for free silver because the people of Ne- 
braska were for it and that  h e  would look up 
the arguments later. More important to Bryan 
was his certainty that  larger issues revolved 
around the money question. In his view, the 
money issue was about democracy and the right 
of people to govern themselves. 
Bryan took the stage in Chicago in defense 
of a n  honored principle, a cause he  described 
as nothing less than the "cause of h ~ m a n i t y . " ~ ~  
Suggesting that  the contest at  issue in the con- 
vention and campaign cannot be reduced to 
individuals, Bryan claims h e  is merely acting 
under "binding and solemn instructions" of 
those for whom he speaks, the "plain people" 
of the country.29 Their judgment on  the silver 
issue has already been rendered, and they, 
being "equals before the law," have come to 
say to the gold delegates whose supposed ex- 
perience in the world of business afforded them 
a greater understanding of business issues, you 
"have made the definition of business man too 
limited in its application."30 In  a series of rhe- 
torical divisions, Bryan speaks for the "broader 
class of business man," contrasting the em- 
ployed and the employer, the country lawyer 
and corporate counsel, the farmer who "goes 
forth in the morning and toils all day" and the 
"man who goes upon the board of trade and 
bets upon the price of grain." He  maintains 
that the man working in the mines is as much 
a businessman as the "few financial magnates 
who, in a back room, corner the money of the 
~ o r l d . " ~ '  
By broadening the definition of "business- 
man" to include the "plain people" of the coun- 
try, Bryan expands the principle of equality to 
the principles of democracy and democratic 
decision making. While h e  states that "we say 
not  one word against those who live upon the 
Atlantic coast," the rhetorical division, the  
social dualism between the robbers and the 
robbed, the  monied interests and the  hard 
working-laborers, the Eastern cities and the  
farms and prairies of the West, is clear through- 
out Bryan's initial development of the silver 
issue.32 
In his recent analysis of the "Cross of Gold" 
speech, William Harpine argues that  the con- 
sistent and often stark divisions drawn by Bryan 
throughout the  address are best understood 
rhetorically as a radical form of "p~lar iza t ion."~~ 
In  this polarizing rhetoric, the gold standard 
serves as a "flag issue," a concrete way of sym- 
bolizing more widespread divisions through 
the creation of a common and identifiable 
enemy. While often appropriate for solidify- 
ing support among like-minded constituen- 
cies,  as i n  socia l  movement s ,  H a r p i n e  
maintains Bryan's confrontational use of the 
gold standard polarized potential voters and 
contributed to-his electoral defeat.34 
While it is accurate to suggest that Bryan 
uses the gold standard as a flag issue in oppo- 
sition to bankers and organized wealth of the 
East, it is equally important to recognize and 
appreciate that  the divisions he  created were 
based upon and symbolic of his vision of equal- 
ity and American democracy. Tha t  is, Bryan's 
opposition to the gold standard and its sup- 
porters stemmed from his belief that  both were 
abjectly undemocratic. In speaking for the  
"hardy pioneers" of the West who are as de- 
serving as anyone to be heard in a democracy, 
Bryan establishes his constituency's position 
as both defensive and democratic. He  states: 
"[Wle do not  come as aggressors. Our war is 
not a war of conquest; we are fighting in the 
defense of our homes, our families, and poster- 
ity." This defense has been democratically 
waged before, yet the plain people's "petitions 
have been scored," "entreaties have been dis- 
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regarded," and their begging has been mocked. 
Having established these people's own demo- 
cratic legitimacy by illustrating that  they have 
indeed followed democratic procedures, Bryan 
can more authoritatively demand their voices 
be heard: "[Wle beg n o  longer, we entreat n o  
more; we petition n o  more. W e  defy them."35 
In  turning directly to the role of monetary 
policy in democracy, Bryan makes explicit the 
relationship between the money question and 
the  principles of democracy by essentially 
equating the two. Intimating the historically 
contingent nature of democracy, h e  states: 
"[Tlhe principles upon which Democracy rests 
are as everlasting as the hills, but . . . they 
must be applied to new conditions as they 
arise."j6 The  newest condition is the  right to 
coin and issue money, which Bryan and his 
followers believe is a function of government. 
Again, Bryan makes the contrast clear by hon- 
oring sacred traditions and ideals of American 
democracy: "Those who are opposed to this 
proposition tell us tha t  the  issue of paper 
money is a function of the bank, and that the 
Government ought to go out of the banking 
business. I stand with Jefferson rather than 
with them, and tell them, as he  did, that  the 
issue of money is a function of government, 
and that  the banks ought to go out of the  
governing business."37 
Standing with Jefferson and on  the side of 
the sovereign democratic citizens of the West 
and Great Plains, with the "struggling masses" 
rather than the "idle holders of capital," Bryan 
asks his audience where the Democratic party 
shall stand. In a phrase foreshadowing debates 
of modern politics, Bryan states that one party 
believes if you "make the well-to-do prosper- 
ous, their prosperity will leak through on  those 
below. T h e  Democratic idea, however, has 
been that  if you legislate to make the masses 
prosperous, their prosperity will find its way 
up through every class which rests upon 
them."3K Bryan is not simply making a distinc- 
tion between the political parties. He  is also 
maintaining that  America itself "rests" on  the 
often less prosperous masses, which Bryan sees 
in particularly agrarian form. In one of the 
more often quoted passages of the address, 
Bryan states: "You come to us and tell us that  
the great cities are in favor of the gold stan- 
dard; we reply that  the great cities rest upon 
our broad and fertile prairies. Burn down your 
cities and leave our farms, and your cities will 
spring up again as if by magic; but destroy our 
farms and the grass will grow in the streets of 
every city in the country."39 
Bryan returns to the  claim that  the issue is 
as great as any the country has seen, equating 
the battle over the money issue with the very 
revolution that created America: "Our ances- 
tors, when but three millions in number, had 
the courage to declare their political indepen- 
dence of every other nation; shall we, their 
descendants, when we have grown to seventy 
millions, declare that  we are less independent 
than our  forefather^?"^^ He  assures his audi- 
ence that this will "never be the verdict of our 
people" and concludes with the  phrase that  
gave the  address its name: "Having behind us 
the producing masses of the nation and the 
world, supported by the commercial interests, 
the laboring interests, and toilers everywhere, 
we will answer their demand for a gold stan- 
dard by saying to them: You shall not  press 
down upon the brow of labor this crown of 
thorns, you shall not  crucify mankind upon a 
cross of gold."41 
Several themes inherent to Bryan's vision 
of democracy emerge from the "Cross of Gold" 
speech. First, and perhaps most obviously, 
Bryan consistently invokes a social dualism, a 
rhetorical division which forms the founda- 
tion of populism. According to Kazin, popu- 
lism should be viewed as "a language whose 
speakers conceive of ordinary people as a noble 
assemblage not  bounded narrowly by class, 
[who] view their elite opponents as self-serv- 
ing and undemocratic, and [who] seek to mo- 
bilize the former against the latter."42 A gold 
standard does not serve the interests of the 
plain people, the foundation of democracy, 
and is therefore itself situated as undemocratic 
and elitist. If Bryan engaged in polarization, 
he  sought to draw a sharp distinction not sim- 
ply between the rich and poor, East and West, 
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elite and "plain," but, more importantly, be- 
tween those who believed in democracy and 
those who did not. 
Second, Bryan grounds his view of democ- 
racy in what many scholars have called the  
"agrarian myth." This myth, often linked with 
Jeffersonian ideals, holds the  simple yeoman 
farmer as the avatar of effective self-gover- 
nance and democratic virtue and the  small 
towns and farming communities throughout 
the land as the bedrock of democracy. In  his 
book on  the 1896 presidential campaign, his- 
torian and Bryan biographer Paul Glad argues 
that  t he  "agrarian mythn was more than a 
theme Bryan employed in  the  convention 
speech, it was the basis of the  entire cam- 
paign. Glad maintains that  in the contest be- 
tween Bryan and McKinley, each attempted 
to define democracy through competing myths: 
the "agrarian myth," represented by Bryan, and 
the  "myth of the self-made man," represented 
by McKinley. Glad makes clear that McKinley 
joined Bryan on  the rhetorical terrain of de- 
fining democracy, but asserted a different ideal: 
"[McKinley] quarreled not with the abstract 
idea of democracy but with Bryan's agrarian 
conception of it. As committed to the myth of 
the self-made man as Bryan was to the agrar- 
ian myth, McKinley did not question the mo- 
rality that  came with industrial expansion. . . . 
Industry built their morality around Darwin- 
ian concepts; and Social Darwinism as the new 
system of values came to be called, seemed 
plausible to those who had faith in the myth 
of the self-made man."43 This "new system of 
values" begins to emerge as a public philoso- 
phy that forms an often "unreflective back- 
ground" to questions concerning industrial 
expansion, helping to frame both the ques- 
tion of money and the question of democracy 
during the era. 
Finally, these themes are emblematic of the 
larger mythology of democracy, a mythology 
that is simultaneously historical and contem- 
porary, elastic enough to capture various ide- 
als in various historical periods, and sacred to 
the meanings and identity of a particular cul- 
ture. Many questioned Bryan's insistence o n  
defining the 1896 campaign around the  money 
question, saying it crowded out many other 
issues contained in the platform of the  Popu- 
list and Democratic parties.44 Issues such as 
the  direct election of senators or government 
ownership of railroads might have more le- 
gitimately alleviated the imbalance of power 
at  the heart of the agrarian revolt. From a 
rhetorical perspective, however, free silver is 
not  simply a single issue upon which voters 
might analyze the  positions of candidates and 
render judgment in the campaign. Rather, the  
silver issue becomes symbolic of democratic 
decision making and self-governance, a rhe- 
torical construct seeking to explain and de- 
fine a larger reality about the importance and 
proper character of American democracy. 
Bryan said throughout the  campaign that  solv- 
ing the  money question was necessary before 
subsequent reforms were possible; this was true 
not  only with respect to alleviating the power 
of monied interests in the development and 
framing of future reforms, but also because citi- 
zens who felt their  voices were excluded 
needed to establish themselves as a part of the  
larger governing body. 
Eighty percent of eligible voters made it to 
the polls o n  3 November 1896; the  majority of 
them voted for William McKinley. Bryan's 
popular vote of just under 6.5 million ( t o  
~ c ~ i n l e ~ ' s  7 million) was more than respect- 
able in light of the powers of the Republican 
machine and a staggering disparity in cam- 
paign finances. (While figures vary widely, 
contributions McKinley received from J.  P. 
Morgan and Standard Oil alone surpassed the 
total fund of the  Democratic party.)45 T h e  
legacy of Bryan's campaign, however, would 
be more lasting. As Kazin writes: "Despite the  
outcome, the conviction at  the heart of Bryan's 
candidacy lived on in more than a half-cen- 
tury of public rhetoric and action."46 While 
the money issue itself faded, its symbolic reso- 
nance did not: "[Tlhe idea that  the federal 
government should routinely take the side of 
wage earners and other citizens of modest 
means grew in popularity and was the basis for 
the  domestic politics of liberal presidents from 
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Woodrow Wilson to Lyndon J ~ h n s o n . " ~ ~  Thus, 
while Bryan's advocacy of free silver may not 
have secured him the presidency, his populist 
vision of democracy, a n  essential element un- 
derlying the entire campaign, had a funda- 
menta l  impact  o n  t h e  unders tanding of 
democracy that moved into the turn of the 
century and the progressive movement. 
The  "Cross of Gold" speech continues to 
hold a hallowed place in the annals of rhe- 
torical history, securing Bryan's place as one 
of America's great orators in the tradition of 
what Kathleen Hall Jamieson calls the "old 
stylen of rhetorical eloquence.48 Of course, 
Bryan would not leave his mark only with such 
a rousing success. If the "new system of val- 
ues" of Social Darwinism was at  the heart of 
the debate between Bryan and McKinley, it 
would only become further solidified as a com- 
mon background for politics in the proceed- 
ing twenty years. Bryan continued to contest 
the view, eventually taking his battle to the 
place h e  saw as the  first l ine of defense: 
America's public schools. 
THE CRIME OF '22: CRUCIFYING MAN- 
KIND ON "GUESSES THAT ENCOURAGE 
GODLESSNESS" 
If the  dualism between the plain people 
and the educated elite was a staple of the popu- 
list language Bryan employed throughout his 
1896 campaign, a potential irony finds the  
first decade of the twentieth century bringing 
more and more Americans into both high 
schools and land-grant universities across the 
country as the progressive movement began 
to take shape. Citing a "phenomenal expan- 
sion" in public education, Eric Goldman re- 
ports that  even a college degree was "nothing 
spectacular for the child of a moderately suc- 
cessful farmer" by the end of the decade.49 Such 
enlightenment could not,  however, stave off 
the anxiety and confusion many Americans 
felt toward rapidly advancing technology and 
the increasingly grand scale of modern indus- 
trial life. By the 1920s, influential writers such 
as Walter Lippmann remarked on  a crisis of 
democracy and the loss of an  American "pub- 
lic" brought on  by modern influences, espe- 
cially the mass media. Lippmann's Public Opinion, 
published in 1922, argued that  the nature of 
American democracy had fundamentally 
changed since its inception. Given the com- 
plexity of the modern world, he  contended 
the average American was in many ways n o  
longer cpalified to make judgments on  the 
important matters of the day. Lippmann re- 
jected the "democratic fallacy" of self-rule and 
argued that government should be directed 
primarily by a more elite class of experts. 
Lippman would continue to question compe- 
tency in his sequel volume, The Phantom Pub- 
lic, where h e  wrote: "The 'omni-competent 
citizen' capable of effectively acting within a 
modern democracy is a 'false ideal,' it is unat- 
tainable. The  pursuit of it is mi~leading."~' In 
the context of a modern, urban, and industrial 
society, he  summed up his view of the citizen: 
"The number of mice and monkeys known to 
have been deceived in laboratories is surpassed 
only by the hopeful citizens of a dem~cracy."~ '  
Lippmann advocated bureaus of experts who 
would organize issues into more manageable 
frames, allowing for a limited form of citizen 
input that  would more readily approximate 
what citizens were actually capable of provid- 
ing. 
If Lippmann was the  most noted for his 
analytical insight, he  was certainly not the 
only one questioning the  efficacy of popular 
democracy during this period. Out  of this con- 
fusion-indeed, arguably because of this con- 
fusion-progressive leaders began to take a 
more national orientation to the  practice of 
democracy and  democratic reform. Many 
progressives enveloped populist beliefs in wide- 
spread popular democracy, but they attempted 
to model democratic governance on  the basis 
of a unified, national community whose inter- 
ests were best determined through the objec- 
tivity pov ided  by a scientific elite. James 
Morone characterizes the development as two 
competing forms of progressivism. The  first 
group, represented in part by Lippmann, em- 
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braced the great scale of twentieth-century 
America and spoke for a constituency of a 
single, national people. The  alternative group, 
representing a more traditionally "populist" 
vision espoused by Bryan, believed "democ- 
racy resided in the 'collective will' of small 
communities across A m e r i ~ a . " ~ ~  
While often looking "wistfully to Jefferson" 
and invoking republican ideals associated with 
the agrarian myth, Morone argues that pro- 
gressive practices increasingly became closer 
to  Lippmann than to Jefferson. He writes, 
"[Tlhe Progressives pushed democracy back 
on the people, then seemingly snatched it 
safely away to the expert."53 In 1925 the issue 
of teaching the theory of evolution in public 
schools stood at the center of this debate con- 
cerning the scope of democracy and the proper 
role of expertise in an increasingly complex 
world. Aside from famed writers such as H. L. 
Mencken who were unapologetic in their dis- 
missal of democracy, many progressives found 
the distinctions precarious to manage. In a 
letter to friend and famed jurist Learned Hand 
about the Scopes trial, Lippmann wrote: "I 
want your advice badly on the Tennessee case." 
Citing others who believed the "constitution- 
ality of the law ought not be attacked" be- 
cause "such foolishness ought to be within the 
province of the legislature," Lippmann offered 
his own views o n  whether and when democ- 
racy ought to be followed: "Now I know this is 
progressive dogma as we all accepted it in the 
days when the courts were knocking out the 
laws we wanted." Perhaps speaking for many, 
Lippmann continued, "My own mind has been 
getting steadily antidemocratic: the size of the 
electorate, the impossibility of educating it 
sufficiently, the fierce ignorance of these mil- 
l ions of semi- l i tera te  pr ies t r idden a n d  
parsonridden people have got me to the point 
where I want to confine the actions of majori- 
ties."54 
In his Pulitzer Prize-winning history of the 
Scopes trial, Edward Larson explains the case 
in democratic terms. He argues, "[Tlhe issues 
raised by the Scopes trial and legend endure 
precisely because they embody the character- 
istically American struggle between individual 
liberty and majoritarian democracy, and cast 
it in the timeless debate over science and reli- 
g i ~ n . " ~ '  Yet Larson makes clear that the "leg- 
end" of the Scopes trial that resonates through 
history emphasizes the debate almost to the 
exclusion of the struggle. That  is, from lnherit 
the Wind to many of the most influential his- 
tories of the case, Bryan is portrayed as almost 
exclusively concerned with fundamentalist 
beliefs, a literal interpretation of the Bible, 
and antagonistic toward those who would ven- 
ture to teach evolution in the public schools. 
The  historical narrative of the "broken man" 
dramatizes the "fierce ignorance" of the mil- 
lions, with Bryan as their exalted hero and the 
epitome of such ignorance, yet the issue of 
democracy is scarcely a part of the standard 
history of the trial. 
While Bryan no  doubt relished the oppor- 
tunity to engage in a debate o n  the merits of 
evolution, it is important to frame his advo- 
cacy within an  appropriate context. First, 
Bryan saw the Scopes case as primarily about 
the right of common people to decide demo- 
cratically what ought to be taught in their 
schools. Leading up to the trial, he commented 
o n  the case: "I have been explaining this case 
to audiences. It is the easiest case to explain I 
have ever found. The right of the people speak- 
ing through the  legislature, to  control the 
schools which they create and support is the 
real issue as I see it." T o  Bryan, the issue was 
again about democracy. As to the question of 
evolution itself, he  remarked: "I am not so 
sure that it is involved."56 
Additionally, Bryan, almost as devout a 
Jeffersonian as he  was Christian, did not, as 
commonly assumed, seek to  break down 
Jefferson's wall between church and state. In- 
deed, Bryan argued for neutrality on the mat- 
ter of teaching evolution versus creationism, 
maintaining that the Darwinian "hypothesisn 
simply ought to be taught as theory and not 
fact. He did not advocate teaching Genesis 
within the schools. As Bryan recognized, the 
biblical account could not be defended in the 
schools. Thus, Bryan's position in the Scopes 
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matter was to him a familiar one of defending 
the common people and their way of life from 
the forces of an  outside elite. Bryan put it sim- 
ply: "If the Bible cannot be defended in  those 
schools it should not be a t t a~ked . "~ '  
Finally, Bryan was not the intolerant zealot 
he  was portrayed as in Inherit the Wind and in 
other histories of the case. When the issue of 
anti-evolution statutes first arose, Bryan origi- 
nally withheld his support of the Butler Act,  
the law at  issue in Scopes, because he  thought 
there should not be any penalty associated 
with teaching evolution. He  did eventually 
support the Butler Act, but agreed with most, 
including Governor Austin Peay who signed 
it into law, that  it would never be enforced. 
Indeed, Bryan consistently disagreed with any 
penalty and offered to personally pay the fine 
John Scopes incurred in the Scopes trial.58 
While history has been prone to minimize 
the democratic context in which the Scopes 
trial occurred, rhetorical studies on  the trial 
have traditionally focused on  the distinction 
between Bryan's preferred mode of rhetorical 
eloquence and the  constraints placed upon 
his advocacy by the  requisites of the  legal 
forum.59 Even though Bryan was once trained 
as a lawyer, Kathleen Hall Jamieson illustrates 
how the polished orator of political speeches 
and chautauqua addresses was ill prepared 
for his exchange with Darrow. Jamieson ana- 
lyzes the  transcripts of the  trial and concludes 
that Bryan's "rhetorical demise" stemmed from 
his own self-definition as defender of the Bible 
and from his agreement to defend his beliefs 
in a legal forum that by definition empha- 
sized Darrow's strengths as a lawyer and 
Bryan's weaknesses as an  orator.60 There is 
little doubt that  Bryan was outwitted, de- 
feated, and embarrassed o n  the  stand. Yet 
Bryan eagerly anticipated his chance to de- 
fine the case in his closing arguments, a rhe- 
torical form more amenable to his talents. It 
was only when Scopes pleaded guilty to the 
charge and the defense refused their right of 
closing statement that  the  case was subse- 
quently closed and Bryan was left hanging 
without a n  opportunity either to  question 
defense witnesses or to give his own closing 
 argument^.^^ 
Bryan was defeated and legally outmaneu- 
vered in Scopes, but the popular account of 
his being destroyed and broken is question- 
able at  best. As Lawrence W.  Levine argues, 
"If Bryan left the Scopes Trial 'an exhausted 
and broken man' . . . h e  did a masterly job of 
concealing it during the  five days of life re- 
maining to him."62 What  Bryan did do during 
those remaining days was to prepare a speech 
that h e  would reportedly consider his finest 
and that was intended to become the center- 
piece of his continuing battle against t he  
theory of evolution. Published after his death 
by the New York Times and countless other 
newspapers across the nation, the  speech was 
read by millions as Bryan's response to the 
Scopes tria1.'j3 Known as "On Evolution," it 
outlines his objections to the teaching of evo- 
lution and provides insights into how, as the 
late Stephen Jay Gould maintained, Bryan 
"viewed his last battle against evolution as an  
extension of the  populist thinking that had 
inspired his life's 
Arguing against the broken man narrative, 
rhetorical scholar Michael J. Hostetler refers 
to this "undelivered oration" as a "complex 
rhetorical composition, more the work of a n  
artful orator still in his prime than that of a 
sexagenarian in the throes of premature senil- 
 it^."^^ In  a series of five indictments, Bryan 
outlines his objections to the theory of evolu- 
tion and the negative consequences resulting 
from its being taught in the public schools. In  
what Hostetler calls an  "evolution of evolu- 
tion," Bryan argues that the theory of evolu- 
t ion  represents a "moral digression." H e  
outlines how evolution is degrading to human 
beings, contradicts religious beliefs and cor- 
rupts individual lives, turns the most educated 
citizens against society's pressing problems and 
efforts toward public reform, and eventually 
"lays the  blame for World War  I itself a t  
Darwinism's door."66 
Bryan's understanding of evolution is deeply 
flawed, and undoubtedly more so when his 
beliefs are divorced from their proper histori- 
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cal context.67 Yet merely refuting the errors 
inherent in  Bryan's approach to Darwin's 
theory of evolution does little to achieve an  
understanding of Bryan that  extends beyond 
history's already prevalent proclamation of his 
ignorance. T o  understand Bryan and how his 
vision of democracy is emblematic of an  en- 
during strain of democratic discourse, Bryan's 
battle against evolution may be understood 
rhetorically as similar to his fight against the 
gold standard. Like the elephant entering the 
treasury, the monkey entering the  schoolroom 
becomes a symbol around which Bryan's de- 
fense of democracy converges. 
In  "On Evolution," Bryan again claims to 
be speaking in defense of a "majority" of plain 
people against the forces of an  undemocratic 
elite. Recognizing the Constitution, he  states: 
"The majority is not  trying to establish a reli- 
gion or to teach it-it is trying to protect itself 
from the efforts of a n  insolent minority to force 
irreligion upon the children under the guise of 
teaching science.'"j8 In  opposition to true sci- 
ence, Bryan casts evolution as mere "hypoth- 
esis" strung together, "guesses that  encourage 
godlessness." Renewing the populist defense, 
Bryan asks rhetorically: "What right has a little 
irresponsible oligarchy of self-styled intellec- 
tuals to demand control of the schools of the 
United  state^?"^^ T h e  rhetorical division evi- 
dent in this contest is expressed, as it was 
twenty-nine years previous, as a n  effort to pro- 
tect the common people and their way of life 
from the forces of a n  "insolent minority" of 
"supposedly superior intellects." In  place of 
bankers, traders, and monied interests who 
"corner the money of the world" in a "back 
room," Bryan injects the "the inner circle of 
the  iconoclasts whose theories menace all the 
ideals of a civilized society."70 Bryan renews 
an 1896 populist vision of democracy by once 
again speaking as mere representative of a 
community of plain people against the forces 
of a n  undemocratic elite. A t  the same time, 
his rhetorical telos has changed; Bryan is n o  
longer fighting for economic well-being or 
simple representation, h e  is engaged in a battle 
for the ideals and values of a civilized and 
democratic society. In  doing so, h e  relies o n  
familiar dualities, contrasting the ordinary and 
the expert, the community and the individual, 
shared values and scientific hypothesis. T h e  
nobility of the ordinary man, rural virtue, and 
the values of an  agrarian community had al- 
ways been an  essential part of the  agrarian 
myth but had become increasingly lost in the 
context of the early twentieth century and the 
nationalization of the  progressive ideal. 
While one can certainly question Bryan's 
equating all of Darwinism and evolutionary 
theory with a "survival of the fittest" mental- 
ity against which h e  also waged battle in 1896, 
it is clear that  he  believed this formerly "new 
system of values" was no longer new and was 
now a serious threat to American democracy. 
Explicitly invoking Jefferson's distinction be- 
tween brotherhood and force, Bryan writes: 
"Within half a century the 'Origins of Spe- 
cies' had become the Bible of the doctrine of 
the  omnipotence of force." H e  continues, 
"[Wlhat else but the spirit of evolution can 
account for the popularity of the selfish doc- 
trine, 'each one for himself, and the devil take 
the hindmost,' that threatens the very exist- 
ence of the doctrine of br~therhood."~ '  For 
Bryan, McKinley simply failed to question the  
morality of the  selfish doctrine. Darwin made 
it popular. 
Not  only were evolutionists elitist enough 
to believe that  they knew better than com- 
mon people what ought to be taught in public 
schools, but, for Bryan, the  very theory threat- 
ened the root of democracy and was a direct 
affront to the sensibilities and identity of com- 
mon people. Bryan cites Nietzsche's condem- 
nation of the "sympathetic activitiesJJ of the 
"herd," such as caring for the sick, the maimed, 
and the poor, all of which allow the "weak 
members to propagate their kind," as evidence 
of how such "supposedly superior intellects" 
view the common man.72 If generally adopted, 
the theory of evolution would not only "de- 
stroy all sense of responsibility and menace 
the  morals of the it would also make 
a mockery of the common man, and, by exten- 
sion, Bryan's entire vision of democracy. In- 
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deed, it is possible in this light to understand 
much of Bryan's consistent antipathy toward 
"atheists" and "agnostics" as being born in part 
from their elitist dismissal of the common man, 
a disbelief in democracy as much as a disbelief 
in God. 
In  "On Evolution," Bryan speaks as the rep- 
resentative of the plain people in defending 
from attack the shared values that  constitute 
their identity against what Bryan sees as ram- 
pant individualism and moral degradation. T o  
further understand how he relates evolution 
to the principles of democracy, Bryan's sum- 
mary near the  end of the speech is worth quot- 
ing at  length: 
Let us, then,  hear the conclusion of the 
whole matter. Science is a magnificent ma- 
terial force, but it is not  a teacher of morals. 
It can perfect machinery, but it adds n o  
moral restraints to protect society from the 
misuse of the  machine. It can also build 
gigantic intellectual ships, but it constructs 
no moral rudders for the control of storm- 
tossed human vessels. It not  only fails to 
supply the spiritual element needed, but 
some of its unproven hypotheses rob the 
ship of its compass and thus endanger its 
cargo.74 
It is not  questioning Bryan's biblical foun- 
dation or his commitment to the fundamen- 
talist movement to suggest that  underlying his 
crusade against evolution lies a n  equally exi- 
gent concern about American democracy. In 
what seems a thinly veiled reference to his 
progressive friends and their reliance on  sci- 
ence and expertise as a means of democratic 
governance, Bryan maintains that  the "ship" 
of state requires a moral and spiritual element 
as well as an  intellectual one. Further, it is of 
little doubt that Bryan would have considered 
the Roaring Twenties a storm, and that  guid- 
ance and direction for democracy were more 
needed than ever. And  evolution, the "un- 
proven hypothesisn of an  elitist class, is in- 
tent  on  once again "robbing" the  cargo of 
democracy of something central to their iden- 
tity and essential to their ability to navigate 
that storm. 
In  the Scopes trial, Darrow's interrogation 
forced Bryan into a dialectic exchange in which 
his literal interpretation of the Bible was sub- 
ject to intensive and widespread scrutiny. A n  
examination of "On Evolution" illustrates how 
Bryan saw the issue of evolution as a danger to 
democracy as well as religion, and how Bryan's 
vision of democracy, largely consistent with 
his views in 1896, rests upon a n  enduring strain 
of democratic discourse that  is grounded in 
the  agrarian myth and the ideals of civic re- 
publicanism and Jeffersonian democracy. 
CONTINUITIES AND CONCLUSIONS 
William Allen White summed up Bryan's 
political career by calling him "the best politi- 
cal diagnostician and the worst political prac- 
titioner the country had ever seen: never had 
he  been wrong on  a single diagnosis or right 
on  a single solution."75 Hardly a supporter of 
Bryan, the noted journalist acknowledges that  
Bryan had a "curious instinct" for sensing 
"when things were wrong." Leroy Ashby con- 
curs, saying that  this "instinct had again and 
again guided him into the  camps of people 
anxious about the future- people worried that 
the events were rendering them super f lu~us . "~~  
A distinction between diagnosis and prac- 
tice in a n  age of democratic anxiety may pro- 
vide a useful frame in which to conclude the 
present analysis and begin to understand how 
Bryan's vision of democracy continues to reso- 
nate within contemporary American politics. 
Assessing the "discontents" of American de- 
mocracy at  the turn of the twenty-first cen- 
tury, Michael Sandel argues that two concerns 
lie at the heart of present anxieties: "One is 
the fear that ,  individually and collectively, 
we are losing control of the forces that  govern 
our lives. The  other is the  sense that, from 
family to neighborhood to nation, the moral 
fabric of community is unraveling around 
From economic insecurity to a perceived 
loss of shared values, Sandel argues tha t  
American politics is "ill equipped to allay the 
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discontent that  now engulfs it" because the 
public philosophy by which we live cannot 
"speak convincingly about self-government 
and ~ o m m u n i t y . " ~ ~  
In tracing political and legal precedents in 
the creation of what h e  calls a "procedural 
republic," Sandel illustrates how the adminis- 
trative or procedural form of political liberal- 
ism that  frames contemporary public life has 
crowded out a more republican, "civic strand" 
of discourse that  has traditionally animated 
the ideals of American democracy. Liberalism 
as "procedural republic" emphasizes individual 
rights over the public good and necessarily 
"brackets" moral and religious questions from 
public discourse. The state remains neutral 
toward what constitutes a good life, and indi- 
viduals, when entering the political sphere, 
must free themselves of their moral identity 
and commit to a form of political debate in 
which constitutive elements of their identity 
are "bracketed" from public discourse. 
Sandel argues that  such bracketing engen- 
ders a particularly vapid and potentially harm- 
ful form of public discourse. He  writes: "A 
politics that  brackets morality and religion 
too completely soon generates its own disen- 
chantment. Where political discourse lacks 
moral resonance, the yearning for a public life 
of larger meanings finds undesirable expres- 
s i o n ~ . " ~ ~  In criticizing the "intolerant moral- 
isms" of groups such as the Moral Majority, 
Sandel argues that  a more pluralistic and tol- 
erant form of community and public life, ca- 
pable of satisfying the  persistent yearning for 
larger meaning, is dependent first on  norms of 
discourse that  are more amenable to a liber- 
ally based understanding of community. T h e  
public philosophy operating in contemporary 
American politics does not  allow for such a 
discourse. Writing in 1994, Sandel might well 
have been assessing the American context and 
prevailing public philosophy of seventy years 
earlier when he  notes: "Fundamentalists rush 
in where liberals fear to tread."*O 
W e  might recall how this same yearning for 
a more communally based and meaningful form 
of democracy, what Morone calls America's 
endur ing "democratic wish," framed t h e  
progressives' use of Jefferson and the agrarian 
ideal of community, but in practice lacked 
forms of organization and association that  
would transform such ideals into realities. 
Today, an  important and growing element of 
contemporary democratic theory emphasizes 
related ideals of community and civic republi- 
canism by advocating methods of achieving a 
stronger, more engaged, and more delibera- 
tive form of American democracy. Ranging 
across a broad ideological spectrum, such theo- 
rists note the importance of community and 
associational life in cultivating democratic 
citizens who both contest and complement 
institutions of democratic self-governance. 
Certainly, I am not  equating the fundamen- 
talism of William Jennings Bryan with such 
theories. As I have tried to show, however, an  
analysis of Bryan reveals that both the prob- 
lems h e  diagnosed and the  themes h e  invoked 
to address those problems continue to reso- 
nate today. 
In  a passage of Bryan's "Cross of Gold" 
speech highlighted earlier, Bryan reminded the 
Democratic convention that  "the principles 
upon which Democracy rests are as everlast- 
ing as the hills, b u t .  . . they must be applied to 
new conditions as they arise." In  assessing 
Bryan's less successful role as political practi- 
tioner, we might look beyond both "silver" 
and "anti-evolution" to appreciate how the 
possibility of achieving the democratic prin- 
ciples for which h e  fought would require a 
sustained form of democratic practice tha t  
William Jennings Bryan as beloved "celebrity 
politician" would be perhaps least equipped to 
provide. Tha t  is, a "Bryanesque" democracy 
based on  Jeffersonian principles and agrarian 
ideals would necessarily be more participatory, 
engaged, and deliberative than a traditional 
firebrand populism may allow. The  ideals of 
equality and community, which Bryan helped 
usher into the Progressive Era and which still 
resonate today, may have lost their constitu- 
en t  ties in an  age of rapid industrialization, 
rising consumerism, and a nationalization of 
the progressive movement. If democracy was 
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"snatched safely away to the expert" during 
this era, it likely remains there today, and vari- 
ous forms of community and associational life 
might provide the best hope for citizens to 
reclaim it again. This would put the onus for 
democracy directly back on citizens, requiring 
more peers and fewer "peerless leaders," but it 
would be in line with a vision of democracy 
Bryan consistently defended. 
The author wishes to thank Mary Beth Collery 
and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful com- 
ments on an earlier version of this essay. 
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